One key strategy enabling Russia to circumvent sanctions is the creation and maintenance of complex supply networks for dual-use goods. Russian entities are attempting to engage third-party countries and employ various loopholes to gain access to technologies critical for the development of its military potential, particularly in the fields of aviation, missile technology, and the production of modern weaponry.
Ensuring the supply of such goods often requires intricate logistical schemes and the use of intermediaries, which complicates the detection and disruption of these supply chains. Understanding these networks is crucial for comprehending how Russia plans to bypass international sanctions. Without clear and timely information, sanctions may fail to achieve their intended goals, and the aggressor will continue to reinforce its military capabilities.
In response to this challenge, former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö proposes the creation of a European intelligence agency that could effectively detect and neutralize such threats. In his report titled “Civil and Military Preparedness and Readiness”, he emphasizes the importance of strengthening cooperation among the special services of EU member states. A particularly important aspect is the need to foresee potential crises.
An important step suggested by Niinistö is the establishment of a “full-scale intelligence cooperation service at the EU level,” which could serve both strategic and operational needs in Europe, as well as the creation of an “anti-subversion network” to protect critical infrastructure. This would enable the European Union to effectively respond to hybrid attacks and other threats arising from Russia’s active actions.
The proposal for such an agency is based on the successful model of the “Five Eyes” — an intelligence-sharing alliance comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This alliance serves as an example of how close cooperation between intelligence agencies can ensure the timely detection of threats and prompt counteraction.
The realization of Niinistö’s idea could become a powerful step toward enhancing the EU’s security, particularly in countering Russia’s attempts to bypass sanctions and supply its military with the necessary resources. A key aspect is that such an agency would not only have a strategy for prevention but also the capability for rapid response to evolving threats. Only through deep integration and information exchange between European countries will it be possible to effectively combat networks actively working to circumvent sanctions.
Thus, for sanctions to work, it is essential to create not only a legal framework but also an intelligence structure capable of anticipating Russia’s moves on the international stage, disrupting its plans to supply dual-use goods, and providing timely responses to aggressive actions.
