In the complex web of global nuclear dynamics, the tentacles of the Russian nuclear energy sector, embodied by “Rosatom,” extend far beyond national borders, ensnaring numerous international actors in a web of dependency.
The question that looms large is why it is crucial to sever these entanglements. Many nations, mistakenly perceiving “Rosatom” through the lens of a ‘peaceful atom’ operator, have allowed the corporation to integrate deeply into their energy markets. This integration includes the construction and operation of nuclear energy facilities, the sale of nuclear fuel, and the establishment of close business ties.
The global energy market remains a favorable arena for “Rosatom,” holding agreements to construct 33 nuclear reactors in ten countries, with orders totaling a staggering $140 billion. Moreover, “Rosatom” has solidified its position in the Global South while continuing its operations in Europe.
One notable instance is Hungary, deepening its collaboration with Russia in the nuclear energy sphere, with “Rosatom” set to complete two nuclear power units. Slovakia, on the other hand, has taken a step back from reducing its dependence on the Russian energy sector, canceling plans to change the nuclear fuel supplier and opting to continue cooperation with “Rosatom.”
The crux of the issue extends beyond Russia’s financial gains from international operations. When it comes to the construction and operation of nuclear facilities, particularly power units, Russia gains control for at least 70 years, wielding influence over technological and technical support throughout the entire life cycle.
Despite possessing their own nuclear technologies and power units, major nuclear powers like the USA and France display reluctance to impose effective sanctions against “Rosatom.” This hesitance stems from their dependence on nuclear fuel supplies from Russia, a dependency rooted in the aftermath of Russia’s entry into the global nuclear materials market in the 1990s.
The Russian nuclear lobby employs various manipulation tactics, such as influencing the American lobby to block sanctions under the pretext of potential electricity price hikes. Even as the international situation seems favorable for “Rosatom,” a shift is underway, with the US considering legislation to ban imports of Russian uranium raw materials and European institutions advising against deals with the corporation.
Recent decisions by Finland, the Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom to distance themselves from “Rosatom” projects signal a turning tide. However, these actions, particularly the UK’s sanctions on a limited number of entities, may be seen as symbolic.
To enact meaningful change, a comprehensive approach is imperative. Imposing effective sanctions against “Rosatom” necessitates serious political will from leading nuclear states—the USA, the UK, and France. Refusing Russian nuclear fuel would not only benefit certain Western states but also limit Russia’s ability to produce nuclear weapons, a critical factor in achieving strategic stability.
With skepticism surrounding Russia’s nuclear capabilities, it becomes evident that the narrative of its exceptional nuclear power does not align with reality. Nevertheless, the threat should not be underestimated, and swift, stringent sanctions are crucial to preventing Russia from developing new models of nuclear weapons, thereby safeguarding global strategic stability. The imperative for effective action is clear, as delay may afford Russia ample opportunities to enhance its nuclear potential, undermining efforts to attain lasting strategic stability.
THIS ARTICLE FIRST APPEARED IN UKRAINEWORLD.
