The Western world attributes realpolitik to Kissinger’s teachings, but in fact, it is a theoretical creation of Ludwig von Rochau and a practical one of Bismarck. We have already discussed on the channel why realpolitik is not about strategy, but about a set of short-term reactions based not on strict adherence to ideological, moral, or ethical norms, but on a pragmatic weighing of the “cost/result” perspective in a short-term management initiative.
These principles were actually developed by Bismarck to maintain his popularity among the masses and in front of the young, ambitious King of Prussia, Wilhelm. By achieving quick results “here and now,” Bismarck bought time for his strategic reform programs, maintaining his popularity and partially satisfying the collective ambitions of the rapidly growing Prussia.
Prussia was in a position where the rapid rise in the country’s global significance led to a rapid increase in excessive ambitions, which, if attempted to be satisfied, could harm the state’s rise. To curb this excessive zeal of the aristocracy, Bismarck implemented realpolitik as a method by which a “bone” could be quickly formed and just as quickly thrown.
In other words, realpolitik was an effective concept for satisfying Prussia’s internal desires and ambitions until the moment when Prussia could actually fulfill these desires in full.
To understand India, one must draw a parallel with Prussia.
India is currently just a rapidly growing country on the global stage. However, it is a country that already has significant geopolitical ambitions but does not yet have sufficient resources to fully satisfy these ambitions.
And the ambitions are there; they consume the support of any leader of the country, including Narendra Damodardas Modi. Any leader who does not satisfy the nation’s ambitions will not last long. These collective ambitions of the country are very difficult to measure; they can rather only be felt. To feel the so-called collective “vibe.”
But still, 80% of the tank fleet depends on supplies of components from Moscow;
Wants to compete with China for regional leadership, but is in the pro-Chinese BRICS due to a number of economic and political reasons;
Has significant contacts with Moscow, which depends on Beijing, which is now supporting Pakistan, which is against India’s national interests, but still… has significant ties with Moscow, because there are a number of factors and 80% of the tank fleet is just one of the reasons.
If we look not from the perspective of Ukrainians, who are fighting for Europe’s democratic values and defending their independence, but from Modi’s perspective, as a leader, he has to deliver quick results to the masses and his entourage. Especially after partially unsuccessful elections.
Therefore, India, or rather Modi, applies classic realpolitik. Does Putin need a picture of his political contacts to pressure the West? No problem.
In return, Modi gets a quick result “from the return of citizens who are in the occupying army of Russia.” Is this a quick result for the people? Yes, it is. Especially in light of the recent surge of dissatisfaction in the media over the deaths of Indians in the Russian army. It reached the point where it became a topic of discussion during the first meeting of Modi’s new-old government and ended with the summoning of the Russian ambassador. For the US, India can say that it “controls its citizens” and prevents their involvement in the war, and this was actually the goal of the visit? It can.
Did India use Putin’s necessity to get a decision on the localization of enterprises and technologies for tank ammunition? 2500 Soviet tanks in India. It did. Moscow held India on this needle for decades. Now the production and technology are on Indian territory, because “just taking and replacing” 2500 tanks with alternatives is a bit difficult. But now Moscow will no longer be able to use this factor to pressure India in case of a deterioration in relations between New Delhi and Beijing.
What was needed for this result? To come and create a picture for Putin? Please. Is it cynical and immoral? Undoubtedly. But international politics at the moment is about interests, not values, no matter how cynical it may be.
If the European Union & USA wants to understand the behavior of countries like India, the EU & USA should look not at the moral-ideological aspect, but at their interests.
But we need to analyze the situation to answer the question of why, despite all the contacts with Moscow, India is reducing its share in many segments of cooperation and mimicking expanded cooperation with the US, Japan, Australia, and even the EU (trade corridor)?
Why did Modi shorten his visit with Putin specifically in the block of “direct negotiations”: is it related to the fact that on the first day of Modi’s stay in Moscow, the US “warned” India? Or were there no more topics that would be interesting to Modi? Or both.
Why did the Indian delegation not agree on the key issue for Moscow — the payment bypass of sanctions? India did not agree to launch RuPay payment cards for Moscow and the launch of the Russian “Mir” system in India.
To understand this, we need to find the answer to the key question: Is Modi acting within the framework of “Bismarckian realpolitik” as a temporarily forced method or within the framework of “Kissingerian distortions”?
Kissinger used realpolitik as a kind of Viagra pill on a permanent basis for a patient who was not yet completely impotent (at that time). When you want but can’t. Realpolitik provides a situational, short-term result to demonstrate “can.” Sometimes it is useful and justified.
But “Viagra” does not restore full functions if treatment is not carried out in parallel, and at some point in the bed of international politics, it will become clear about your real state of “want but can’t.” Kissinger tried for a long time to hide the state of loss of functions in the sexual giant. And unfortunately for Ukrainians, their enemies have already calculated this. To verify it, Putin provoked the US in Georgia, Syria, and many other places.
In Regarding India, it is necessary to calculate whether it has a global strategy where realpolitik is not a way of life, but only a temporary, forced method. Does Modi use realpolitik because it is a strategic “Bismarckian necessity” to maintain basic functions during growth/treatment, or is it a “Kissingerian” desire to avoid heavy treatment and hide dysfunction for as long as possible?
If the former, there is a chance that the moment will come when the West, and therefore Ukraine, can strategically align with India with corresponding consequences in this war. Then Ukrainians should spend time preparing the groundwork for a potential opportunity. If the latter, it is a diagnosis, and Ukrainians should not spend excessive forces beyond situational cases and wait for a “new doctor” (a change of politician or some incredible catalyst for India to reconsider its “life guidelines”).
Playing Kissinger-style realpolitik without the support of the US and the EU is definitely not an option for Ukraine, simply due to the lack of sufficient funds to “buy the pills.” Ukraine only has access to large-scale strategic actions that are stretched over time, much more difficult to implement, but significantly reduce the cost of achieving the result.
