It is tempting to compare the two years. Any potential deal negotiated between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in 2025 may resemble the infamous Munich Agreement of 1938: land for temporary peace. The West has already undermined its position by ruling out NATO membership for Ukraine. Joe Biden has made that clear from the outset, and Trump is likely to take the same view. Hungary and Slovakia (and possibly Austria) would also resist any such idea in contrast to the Baltic States, which are under direct threat from Russia next to Poland and currently Ukraine. So, what will happen if Putin renews his aggression in one, three, or five years?
At a Chatham House conference in December, many participants likened Europe’s current situation to 1938. In that year, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s Munich Agreement handed parts of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, with the hope of avoiding war. That hope proved short-lived. Similarly, any deal in 2025 with Putin might only pause his ambitions. While his military is weakened, Putin may use the time to regroup before resuming his campaign westward.
A complacency seems to be settling in the West, driven more by hope than analysis. Despite suffering massive casualties and equipment losses, Russia continues its slow advance in Donbas. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s manpower crisis grows, and domestic political pressures on President Zelensky intensify. Ukraine needs peace—or at least a pause—far more urgently than Russia.
For Putin, a truce could be tactical. Securing a temporary peace might help Trump claim a diplomatic victory, while giving Putin time to strengthen his position. Once the war resumes, as it likely will, Trump may be even less inclined to intervene.
Trump’s record on peacemaking is poor. His Doha Agreement with the Taliban undermined the Afghan government, and his North Korea talks failed to produce denuclearization. Meanwhile, NATO’s negotiating stance weakens. Before talks have even begun, NATO appears resigned to Russia keeping Crimea and parts of the Kursk salient. Ukraine’s NATO membership remains off the table, as do war crime trials and reparations. Putin, in contrast, will likely push maximalist demands: full control of Donbas, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, and restrictions on NATO troop presence in Ukraine.
Ukraine is left in a precarious position. After the failure of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to protect its sovereignty, Kyiv is understandably wary of new guarantees. Suggestions like deploying European troops as a border tripwire seem impractical, given the sheer scale of the border and Europe’s limited military capacity.
A key difference from 1938 is that the UK no longer has the military power it once did. Years of underinvestment and generous aid to Ukraine have left Britain’s armed forces weakened. Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States now lead Europe’s defense efforts, while Germany’s promised military expansion has faltered.
In 1938, Britain doubled its air force under Chamberlain, which proved vital in 1940. Today, Europe shows no such resolve. The West would strengthen its hand with rearmament but instead projects weakness. This reluctance could embolden Putin and make future conflict inevitable.
Without a strong negotiating position or a willingness to defend Ukraine robustly, Europe risks repeating the mistakes of 1938. A well-negotiated peace remains the best outcome, but time is running out for the West to act decisively.
This echoes 1938, but with notable differences: unlike Britain’s robust military expansion under Chamberlain, modern Europe hesitates to rearm, leaving Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States as its strongest military anchors.
A well-negotiated peace could avert disaster, but only if the West sends a strong message by reinforcing its defenses. Without such resolve, Europe risks repeating the mistakes of appeasement, leaving Ukraine vulnerable and emboldening further aggression. The stakes are high, and the world watches as 2025 approaches.
This article was authored by Tim Willasey-Wilsey originally published by RUSI (Royal United Services Institute). Tim Willasey-Wilsey is a respected commentator on international affairs with a focus on European security. The views expressed in this commentary are solely the author’s and do not reflect the positions of RUSI or any others.
