Russia’s military industry continues to rely on imported components for the production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) despite international sanctions. An analysis of the strike drone Molniya and the reconnaissance drone Fenix revealed extensive use of parts from China and several Western countries, including the United States, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Taiwan.
The Molniya UAV is a fixed-wing strike drone launched via a catapult and guided by an operator. With a flight range of up to 40 km, it can carry a payload of up to 5 kg. While its strike capacity is ten times smaller than that of Iranian Shahed drones, the Molniya is actively used as a terror weapon.
In November 2024, a Molniya drone was deployed to attack civilian targets in the Saltivskyi district of Kharkiv, injuring residents of an apartment building and shoppers in a mall. This incident demonstrated that such attacks on civilian infrastructure are deliberate, as the drone operator maintains direct control over the UAV.
In addition to its combat use, Russia has deployed these drones without warheads to overload Ukraine’s air defense systems.
The Molniya’s design is simple and relies on readily available electronic components, primarily of Chinese origin. Its components include:
- Electric motors and flight controllers from brands such as FATJAY, SpeedyBee, and Caddx;
- Microelectronics chips from Huayi Microelectronics and Trex Technologies.
However, critical modules of the Molniya incorporate Western technology, such as:
- Microcontrollers from the Swiss company STMicroelectronics, which power the flight controllers;
- Converters from the American manufacturer Vishay for engine control;
- Capacitors produced by Japan’s Rubycon.
The Fenix UAV, developed by the Russian company TAIP, is an upgraded version of the widely used Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone. Its electronic system also includes components manufactured in the U.S., Switzerland, China, the Netherlands, and Taiwan.
A distinctive feature of the Fenix is its heavy dependence on components from STMicroelectronics, which supplies seven critical parts. These microcontrollers are produced at the company’s manufacturing sites across nine countries.
Despite international sanctions targeting Russia’s military-industrial complex, Western-made microelectronics continue to appear in Russian drones. This is largely due to:
- Resale through intermediaries (many Chinese companies purchase Western components and supply them to Russian manufacturers);
- Dual-use technology (components initially designed for civilian purposes can also be used in military applications);
- Lack of global end-user controls (insufficient oversight allows military end-users to access restricted technologies).
The widespread use of Chinese and Western components in Russian drones highlights the need for stricter regulation of dual-use technology exports. Combating illicit supplies of such components requires coordinated efforts from all nations that support sanctions against Russia.
