According to an article at Foreign Affairs by Alexander Baunov, a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center and a visiting fellow at the European University Institute, in 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin deployed troops to Syria at the request of dictator Bashar al-Assad. This action aimed to restore Russia’s influence in the Middle East, which had diminished following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Additionally, Putin sought to position Russia as a global power capable of supporting its allies and preventing the overthrow of friendly governments.
The swift collapse of the Assad regime leaves Putin with minimal accomplishments regarding this agenda. Russia faces the potential loss of its military bases in the Middle East. Furthermore, Russia’s isolation from the global community has escalated following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Russia’s intervention in Syria sent a clear message to smaller nations not closely aligned with Western powers: align with us, and we will protect you from regime changes supported by the West. For more than ten years, that assertion appeared to hold validity. Currently, the situation appears altered. The potential downfall of Assad undermines Russia’s assertion of being a stabilizing force for allied regimes. Russia can no longer effectively export security abroad.
IMPORTANT ROLE
Putin characterized Russia’s involvement in Syria as a strategic counterterrorism initiative. Despite the West’s dismissal of Russia’s proposal for collaboration against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria, it acknowledged the fact of Russia’s participation in the conflict against a shared adversary. The United States, Turkey, and various Gulf states have initiated military communication channels with Russia, moving away from the previous narrative that characterized it solely as an international pariah following its annexation of Crimea.
In the context of supporting the Assad regime, Russia has intensified its collaboration with Iran by forming a joint military commission, supplying S-300 missiles to Tehran in defiance of U.S. objections, and seeking options to circumvent international sanctions. The Gulf states acknowledged Moscow’s demonstration of military strength in a complex conflict. Assad’s reinstatement in the Arab League, the rise in high-level interactions between Russia and Gulf nations, the increase in trade between Russia and the United Arab Emirates, and the coordinated oil policy between Saudi Arabia and Russia all indicate a significant shift in regional dynamics.
The Middle East was not the only region to respond positively. Countries in Africa, Central Asia, and, to a lesser extent, Latin America perceived Moscow’s capacity to protect an allied regime from internal unrest and potential overthrow as a source of reassurance. Historically, Russia has faced challenges in positioning itself as a credible investor or exporter of technology, with the exception of its involvement in constructing nuclear facilities and providing military equipment. The successful defense of Assad enabled the Kremlin to position itself as a provider of security. The Kremlin achieved this through both official and unofficial channels, including the Russian armed forces and mercenaries like the Wagner paramilitary group. The latter engaged directly on the ground alongside the Syrian army, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, while the Russian Armed Forces primarily conducted operations from the air.
The presentation demonstrated a high level of effectiveness. African governments, including those in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, and South Sudan, as well as secular post-Soviet regimes in Central Asia such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, have engaged Russian troops and mercenaries to address challenges posed by armed guerrillas, Islamist factions, and separatist movements. Additionally, local armed forces and protection services have received training from these forces. The intervention in Syria has reinforced Central Asian governments’ historical view of Russia as a safeguard against internal turmoil stemming from Islamist movements and Western-supported political dissent.
Through the prevention of Assad’s overthrow and the restoration of his control over the majority of the territory previously lost to rebels, Russia showcased its capacity to influence and alter the trajectory of events within the region. Concurrently, Gulf nations received proposals for investment initiatives in Russia, along with diplomatic backing from the Kremlin. The historically strained relationships between the Soviet Union and Gulf monarchies, stemming from the support of revolutionary factions and regimes in the area, along with post-Soviet frictions linked to Russia’s conflict in Chechnya, competition in the hydrocarbon sector, and Putin’s strengthened connections with Iran, have evolved into a phase of rapprochement. The Syrian intervention served as a pivotal factor in establishing a lasting new Russian presence in the Middle East.
LOST LEVERAGE
A number of nations, such as China, India, Vietnam, and the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, identified potential advantages arising from Russia’s isolation from Western countries. As Western firms and investors withdrew from Russia, non-Western entities capitalized on the opportunity to enter the Russian market, facilitating the country’s ability to navigate around imposed sanctions. The loss of Assad is unlikely to produce an immediate impact on the efforts of these businesses and governments to capitalize on Russia’s isolation. The swift disintegration of a Russian ally could potentially alter their readiness to associate with Russia, particularly if it jeopardizes their relationships with Western nations.
The capacity of Russia to extend military support to its allies has resulted in a heightened demand for its security services across the Middle East and Africa; however, the fall of Assad is expected to negatively impact that demand. Russia’s military bases in Syria, which it may potentially lose access to, facilitated the refueling of ships and planes and the supply of troops to both regions. Lacking a physical presence in the Middle East complicates matters significantly.
The success of the rebels in Syria highlights the constraints of Russia’s security and economic support to its allies globally. Moscow effectively assisted Assad in reclaiming military and political authority over a significant portion of the country; however, it ultimately struggled to deliver a conclusive defeat to the resistance over time.
Russia did not succeed in fostering economic development in Syria nor in compensating for the Western investments that went into the country during the initial years of Assad’s governance. In regions under the control of Islamist rebels supported by Turkey, the living standards ultimately exceeded those found in areas governed by Damascus with the backing of Russia and Iran.
NEW WORLD ORDER MANIA
Russia is likely to face the consequences of Assad’s downfall and the potential loss of its military installations in the Mediterranean. The Russian perspective on the Syrian expedition has consistently been characterized by a sense of caution and indifference; the notion of deploying troops to a remote Muslim nation has historically lacked popularity and has stirred recollections of the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan. The Russian strategy involved a focused, technologically advanced air campaign, executed with a restrained deployment of ground forces, which appeared to satisfy their operational objectives. In a war against Ukraine, Putin has experienced a further decline in a previously established success in Syria: the trust of his citizens in Russia’s capacity to achieve rapid victories through technological advancements.
Russia and Iran have not succeeded in promoting economic development in Syria or in drawing additional support for Assad’s regime. Investors from Gulf countries, India, and China did not converge on Syria despite the security guarantees provided by Russia and Iran. Currently, as Russia seeks assistance from Erdogan to evacuate its military and civilian personnel from Syria, it assumes a position reminiscent of the one it previously attributed to the United States: a nation removed from the intricacies of the region, sidelined by local political actors who are disinclined toward the involvement of external forces.
It is evident that Russia lacks the capacity to offer its allies adequate military assistance and economic growth, prompting regimes that once relied on Russian support to reassess their positions.
Rulers anticipating assistance from Russia may find themselves taken aback by the rapidity with which it aims to forge connections with Syria’s emerging leadership. Prior to Assad’s exit, Russian television ceased referring to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization. Recently, Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic, has suggested, seemingly with Kremlin endorsement, the removal of the “terrorist” designation from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Additionally, the government has permitted the Syrian embassy in Moscow to display the rebel flag. Moscow is currently initiating direct communication with the newly formed Syrian government.
The decline of Assad and Russia’s apparent indifference to the disintegration of his regime indicate that Putin’s priorities have shifted, placing his primary emphasis on achieving a significant victory over Ukraine, rather than on the welfare of Syria or any other allied state. We should interpret Putin’s decision carefully, as it does not indicate a complete retreat from Russian ambitions beyond its immediate neighborhood. The loss of Syria has effectively heightened the stakes of the conflict in Ukraine. In Putin’s framework, Ukraine represents a critical juncture in a worldwide conflict between the Western elite and an emerging, Russian-led order: should Ukraine succumb, Russia anticipates advancing into Georgia and other territories of interest, positioning itself once more as a formidable patron to nations globally. In the interim, Moscow’s assurances will lack substance.
After Syria Russian Allies Can’t Rely on Moscow Anymore
